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More than 63 years after it began on June 25, 1950, the Ko-
rean War has not yet formally ended. Since the Allies’ jointly 
imposed decision at the Potsdam Conference in July 1945 to 
divide Korea at the 38th parallel, Koreans have unsuccessfully 
tried to unify the country. It was one such attempt, initiated by 
the North that became the immediate cause of the war. Thanks 
to previously unpublished primary sources, we now know 
more about the beginning of the Korean War than we have 
at any point, yet a number of interesting and important ques-
tions are still unanswered. In the context of the post-Cold War 
era, perhaps the most intriguing question about the start of 
the Korean War remains: why did Stalin decide to approve the 
invasion of South Korea in June 1950? This paper will explore 
the combination of factors that influenced Stalin’s decision to 
support the invasion and explain the considerations that were 
most important for him. Among his considerations were po-
tential American reactions to an attack, the role of China in an 
invasion, and North Korea’s military strength vis-à-vis South 
Korea.
In the years immediately following the invasion of South Ko-
rea, analysts of the war reached different conclusions about 
how and why it began. Earlier accounts by American scholars 
agreed with the interpretation of the Truman administration 
that the invasion was part of a “Soviet war plan.” Historian Da-
vid Dallin, who had a deep background in Russia, contended 
that it was “planned, prepared, and initiated” by Joseph Sta-
lin. Other, more recent scholars, such as Bruce Cumings, have 
considered the possibility that Kim Il-Sung did not gain Sta-
lin’s approval for the attack at all. When analyzing Stalin’s role 
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in the attack, one must first under-
stand the nature of his relationship 
with Kim Il-Sung in the years (and 
months) leading up to the start of 
the Korean War, as well as his views 
of the post-World War II order and 
Korea’s place in it.
The USSR & Korea after World War II
One of the best resources for under-
standing the relationship between 
Stalin and Kim Il-Sung is a collection 
of Soviet documents that were made 
publicly available after the dissolution 
of the Soviet Union. In June 1994, 
President Kim Young-Sam of South 
Korea visited Russian President Bo-
ris Yeltsin in Moscow. During their 
meeting, Yeltsin presented, from 
Russian archives, two hundred and 
sixteen previously classified Soviet 
documents on the Korean War.  The 
collection contains high-level doc-
uments from 1949 to 1953, totaling 
five hundred and forty eight pages. 
One particularly revealing document 
from the collection contains the min-
utes of a March 5, 1949, meeting be-
tween Stalin and Kim Il-Sung.
That meeting took place at the Mos-
cow Kremlin after Kim and his del-
egation had traveled there by train 
from Pyongyang. The North Kore-
an leader had come to Moscow to 
secure greater economic and cul-
tural assistance from the USSR for 
his newly established DPRK. Stalin 
spoke to Kim as his patron, asking 
Kim directly how much assistance 
he required. The document shows a 
North Korean leader who was com-
pletely dependent economically on 
the Soviet Union. It is also worth 
noting that because very few Koreans 
had been permitted to receive higher 
education or gain management expe-
rience under Japanese colonial rule, 
North Korea was dependent on the 
Soviet Union for technical expertise 
as well as economic assistance.
If we accept the view put forward by earlier scholars that the in-
vasion of South Korea was a long-premeditated part of a grand 
Soviet war plan, then we should expect to find evidence from 
before 1949 that shows high-ranking Soviet officials planning 
to take control of the Korean peninsula. On the contrary, the 
documentary evidence from the CPSU and Russian Foreign 
Ministry archives indicates that from February 1945 until Jan-
uary 1950 Stalin’s intention in Korea was simply to maintain 
the balance of power. While his goals for Europe were expan-
sionist, Stalin’s post-war policies toward Korea were consid-
erably less so, balancing Soviet strategy against US interests. 
Other than attaining the southern Kuriles from Japan at the 
end of World War II, Stalin sought only a return to Russia’s 
1905 position in the Far East, and at the Yalta Conference in 
early February 1945 he made no demands at all with respect 
to Korea.
The CPSU and Soviet Foreign Ministry documents written in 
the 1940s do not indicate policy debates of any kind, and for 
that reason it is reasonable to conclude that reports circulated 
in the Foreign Ministry reflected opinions and recommen-
dations directly from the top. One reference paper on Korea, 
written by two Soviet Foreign Ministry officials in the Second 
Far Eastern Department responsible for Korea in June 1945 
clearly indicates Soviet thinking about Korea in the months 
following the Yalta conference. The paper was written as back-
ground for future negotiators at the Potsdam Conference, and 
gives an extensive history of the power competition over Ko-
rea for about one hundred years prior to 1945.
The authors of this short report list five Soviet conclusions 
bearing on the resolution of the Korean question. First, the 
Russian struggle against Japanese expansion through Korea 
in 1904-1905 was justified, however, at the time Russia lacked 
the strength to prevent the Japanese colonization of Korea (in 
large part because Japan had the support of England, Germany 
and the United States). Second, Japan must always be excluded 
from Korea because a Korea ruled by Japan would again be-
come a continuous threat to the eastern USSR. Third, Korea 
must not be turned into a staging ground for future aggression 
against the USSR by any power, and therefore any future Ko-
rean government must be friendly to the USSR. Fourth, the 
resolution of the Korean question may prove difficult because 
of conflicting interests in Korea and because the US and/or 
China may try to compensate Japan for its war losses by rec-
ognizing Japanese economic interest in Korea. Last, if a UN 
trusteeship is established, the Soviet Union must have a prom-
inent role in it. This report helps to reveal the true nature of 
the Soviet government’s aims in Korea following World War 
II. The USSR’s intention was to keep Japan out of Korea and to 
ensure that Korea would never be hostile to the Soviet Union.
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On August 14, 1945, at Potsdam, Stalin approved the US 
proposal to divide Korea at the 38th parallel without dis-
cussion. Earlier, he had directed Soviet soldiers to stop 
at the 38th parallel, even though US forces did not reach 
South Korea until weeks later in September 1945. Foreign 
Ministry archive documents from September 1945 indicate 
that the Soviet government did not have a plan for the ulti-
mate political settlement of Korea at that time, although it 
thought that a United Nations trusteeship could potential-
ly counter American gains in the Pacific. The Soviet Union 
also did not support activities of the communist party in 
South Korea, or directly engage in any agitation propaganda 
in the American zone in the years after World War II. It is 
therefore fairly clear that the Soviet Union did not have a 
strategic plan to take control of the entire Korean peninsula 
following World War II.
Why did Stalin change his mind in 1950?
The documentary record currently available indicates 
that in January 1950 a combination of factors led Stalin to 
change his mind regarding Kim Il-Sung’s proposed inva-
sion of South Korea. Although we cannot yet definitively 
answer the question of which factors were most important 
in his decision-making, the evidence suggests that several 
considerations took precedence. First, Stalin believed that 
the United States most likely would not intervene to defend 
South Korea. At the same time, the Soviet relationship with 
the PRC was such that if the US did intervene, there could 
be substantial benefits for the Soviet Union anyways.
By June 1949, American forces had been almost entirely 
withdrawn from Korea. The Soviet Union performed its first 
nuclear test, codenamed RDS-1, on August 29, 1949. On 
September 3, 1949, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Vyshin-
sky received a telegram from Terenty Shtykov, the Soviet 
ambassador to North Korea. The telegram reveals that once 
again Kim had requested Stalin’s permission to attack the 
South, this time claiming that the South Korean military was 
preparing an attack on the DPRK. Kim’s petition was that 
he be enabled to make a more or less equivalent counterat-
tack, although he added that it would not be difficult to take 
control of the entire peninsula “if the international situation 
permits,” which was surely a reference to possible American 
reactions or non-reactions. A September 11 telegram from 
then-Deputy Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko to 
the Soviet Embassy in Pyongyang suggested that, by that 
time, Stalin had begun to warm up to the idea of assisting 
North Korea in a military campaign, although he hadn’t yet 
approved Kim’s request. Another telegram, this one sent to 
Moscow from the Soviet chargé d’affaires in Pyongyang on 
September 14 declared Kim’s attack plan not yet advisable. 
All of these documents provide indirect indications that So-
viet calculations of potential US involvement were always 
important in Soviet considerations about Kim’s requests for 
a military campaign against the South.
On January 12, 1950, Stalin received a clear indication that 
the United States would not intervene in a Korean war when 
US Secretary of State Dean Acheson allowed that Korea was 
outside the American defense perimeter in the Pacific in his 
speech before the National Press Club. Stalin finally gave his 
approval to Kim’s request in late January 1950. The timing 
of Stalin’s approval supports the conclusion that US policy 
toward Korea played a significant role in Stalin’s decision. 
When viewed in combination with the record of his actions 
in June 1950, Soviet documents suggest that Stalin would 
not have approved North Korea’s attack if the US had clear-
ly indicated that it would defend South Korea. Perhaps the 
Soviets’ new position as a nuclear power, combined with 
Acheson’s statement and an assumption that the US cared 
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more about Europe, led Stalin to think the US was unlikely to 
redeploy troops to Korea.
The Communist victory in China and the February 14, 1950 
Sino-Soviet Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assis-
tance also likely played a substantial role in Stalin’s decision 
to approve the invasion. Since the end of World War II, the 
Soviets had been in principle supportive of the unification of 
Korea under DPRK control. The main issue was whether or 
not an attempt to reunify Korea by force would bring broadly 
favorable results. Stalin’s denials of Kim’s requests for invasion 
plans were for that reason always conditional, and issued on 
the basis of disadvantageous timing. But following the PLA’s 
successful military campaign in China (in which the US had 
failed to intervene decisively), Kim became considerably more 
eager to end the ongoing division of Korea. The idea that the 
PLA could achieve victory in China while Korea was forced to 
remain divided became intolerable to Kim, and he began to 
push for a Communist liberation of South Korea with greater 
and greater urgency.
Furthermore, establishment of the PRC in China meant that 
the Chinese military would finally be able to offer substantial 
support to the North Korean cause. During the Chinese civil 
war, the North Korean government supported communists in 
Manchuria with both manpower and materiel. After the es-
tablishment of the PRC, between fifty thousand and seventy 
thousand Korean PLA veterans returned to North Korea, with 
their weapons. In May 1949, Mao personally promised Kim 
that he would help the Koreans once the fighting in China 
ended. Referring to that promise, Kim ardently appealed to 
Soviet ambassador Shtykov to let him visit Moscow so that 
he could convince Stalin to approve an attack on the South. 
Shtykov reported that conversation to Moscow in a telegram 
to Foreign Minister Vyshinsky on January 19, 1950. Accord-
ing to Shtykov, “Kim… in an excited manner began to speak 
about how now, when China is completing its liberation, the 
liberation of the Korean people in the South of the country is 
next in line.” For Kim, there was no reason to delay the inevi-
table reunification of Korea under his leadership.
Stalin also understood that a war in Korea would bring the 
PRC closer to the USSR, and probably even more importantly, 
keep the PRC diplomatically distant from the United States. 
Before the real planning for the attack began, Stalin pressed 
Kim to secure Mao’s approval as well, saying that Kim could 
“only get down to action after consulting with Comrade Mao 
Tse-Tung personally.” Mao nervously deferred the matter back 
to Stalin, who then replied; “the question should ultimately be 
decided by the Chinese and Korean comrades together,” thus 
protecting his role while avoiding responsibility. With confir-
mation that Chinese soldiers would be sent to reinforce the 
North Koreans if necessary, an attack plan could be arranged 
that would pose minimal risk to the Soviet Union.
Foreseeing that America would send soldiers to Taiwan in the 
event of Chinese troops moving into Korea, Stalin must have 
recognized that Mao would then require Soviet support in 
case of a renewed civil war in China. For Stalin, there would 
be no downside to Chinese participation in the Korean War so 
long as the USSR, PRC, and DPRK were all working together 
and the war did not spread. Despite the fact that the record of 
Soviet deliberation on the Korean question is still fragment-
ed, it seems that the practical basis for planning the attack in 
the months and weeks prior to June 25, 1950, was that mili-
tary victory would be achieved swiftly and decisively. Soviet 
and North Korean military planners believed that the North’s 
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advantage was then at its highest point and the DPRK could 
quickly defeat Southern forces. Because both sides constant-
ly feared attack from the other side, Stalin decided that the 
North should attack while it had the upper hand. Following 
Kim Il-Sung and Pak Hon-Yong’s April 1950 visit to Moscow, 
Stalin sent to Pyongyang a new group of military advisors, ex-
perienced in World War II, along with massive shipments of 
weapons and supplies.
Analyzing Stalin’s reasoning in approving the June 1950 attack 
on South Korea is of course fascinating for historians of the 
Cold War, but questions about how and why the Korean War 
began are relevant today as well, when one seeks to predict 
future international conflicts in and around Eurasia. The start 
of the Korean War shows us that situations can arise, in which 
self-interested, non-empathetic leaders may find that helping 
to start a foreign war provides opportunities without attached 
risks. Contemporaries in the West may have seen Stalin as un-
predictable or wildly aggressive, but as this paper has shown, 
while he did not have a definite long-term plan, his foreign 
policy decisions with respect to Korea were cautious, calculat-
ing, and opportunistic.
With another autocratic and cautiously opportunistic provo-
cateur sitting in the Moscow Kremlin today, analysts and pol-
icy makers should make a serious effort to see the world, and 
assess his interests, from his point of view. Much has changed 
since Putin came to power in 2000, but throughout his time 
in office, he has been engaged in the same grand project – re-
storing Russia to the position of global greatness he believes 
it is entitled to. Since he returned to the presidency in 2012, 
Putin’s top priorities for remaking Russia into a great power 
have been (1) to prevent the expansion of NATO, (2) to forge 
a Eurasian Economic Union that can compete with the EU, 
and (3) to check American power and support autocratic gov-
ernments that the U.S. would seek to change. Though most 
American policymakers might not consider this the best list 
for turning Russia into a great power, in Putin’s mind it is the 
path to success.
With that list in mind, it is not so hard to see why events have 
unfolded as they have in Ukraine over the last year. The Euro-
maidan protest turned revolution threatened all of Putin’s top 
priorities. Without Russian action, a new Western oriented 
government in Kiev could potentially join NATO and the EU 
and enhance American power in the region. Doing his best 
to prevent Ukraine’s westward turn and Europe’s expansion to 
the East, Putin has clearly maintained these priorities. From a 
Western perspective, it is easy to say that today’s Russian lead-
er is flouting international norms and behaving like an impe-
rialist from the last century, but in order to predict how Russia 
will act toward its neighbors going forward, one must weigh 
the potential costs and benefits of every action from the per-
spective of a ruler who, while surely lacking in empathy, is not 
carelessly aggressive or intent on world domination.
Soviet Foreign Ministry and CPSU archives opened in 1993, 
as demonstrated above, have given Western scholars of the last 
twenty years greater insight into the formulation of Soviet pol-
icy than anyone who was writing before 1993 could have had 
support for. Documents already referred to in this paper show 
that the June 25 attack did not originate from a larger Soviet 
War plan, but rather from Kim Il-Sung. Although the USSR 
provided material aid to both the North Korean and Chinese 
armies before and during the war, the initial invasion was pro-
posed and carried out by Kim Il-Sung and his DPRK forces. 
Documents referred to in this paper also disprove the other 
main revisionist argument about the invasion: that North Ko-
rea’s ties to the USSR were minimal and that it acted on its 
own. The available evidence clearly shows that Kim Il-Sung 
had the standing to propose and advocate for his plan of at-
tack, but at the same time did not possess great enough polit-
ical and economic autonomy to attack South Korea without 
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Stalin’s approval.
There is, however, another plausible and interesting theory 
about Stalin’s approval of the invasion. The theory relies on an 
August 27, 1950 telegram from Stalin to Czechoslovak pres-
ident Klement Gottwald. After the North 
Korean invasion in June, the United States 
proposed and received UN Security Coun-
cil approval to intervene in the conflict, 
something it was able to do because the So-
viet Permanent Representative was absent 
during the vote, and thereby was unable to 
veto the Security Council resolution. Like 
other Eastern European leaders, Gottwald 
did not understand Stalin’s decision to avoid 
the vote. Unlike others, he was bold enough 
to send Stalin a letter asking why the USSR 
had not participated. The August 27 tele-
gram is Stalin’s response to Gottwald.
In this document, Stalin defends his decision by offering an 
explanation. He claims there were four reasons why the So-
viet Union left the Security Council. First, he wanted to show 
solidarity with the new China, which the other wartime allies 
refused to recognize. Second, he sought to highlight the absur-
dity of the United States policy of recognizing nationalist Chi-
na in the United Nations Security Council as the official repre-
sentative of China. Third, he wanted to make Security Council 
decisions illegitimate by having two great powers absent; and 
fourth, he intended “to give the American government a free 
hand and give it an opportunity to commit more foolishness 
using a majority in the Security Council so 
that public opinion can see the true face of 
the American government.”
It is this last point that forms the basis for 
Beijing University Professor Donggil Kim’s 
alternate theory of Stalin’s decision. In short, 
Professor Kim argues that Stalin’s letter to 
Gottwald shows that he gave permission to 
Kim Il-Sung to attack South Korea precisely 
because he wanted the United States to be-
come entangled in an East Asian conflict, 
not because he thought the US would not in-
tervene. In Professor Kim’s words, “Stalin hoped for the Unit-
ed States to become entangled in a military conflict in Korea, 
and expected that UN sanctions would better facilitate United 
States entry into the Korean War.” This is an intriguing the-
ory that deserves consideration. It has the notable virtue of 
explaining Stalin’s decision not to participate in the Security 
Council vote after the attack, whereas the opposite interpreta-
tion seems to imply that the Soviet Union’s absence during the 
vote was an inexplicable mistake.
Regarding that same letter to Gottwald, William Stueck ad-
heres to the view that Stalin did not want US intervention and 
says simply, “Why the Soviet Union did not return to the Secu-
rity Council to prevent this remains uncer-
tain.” In fact, what remains uncertain is why 
Professor Kim’s and Stueck’s respective as-
sessments of Stalin’s decision-making must 
remain mutually exclusive. Taking into con-
sideration all of the available evidence, there 
is no reason to doubt the first three reasons 
Stalin gave Gottwald for leaving the Security 
Council. Only his fourth reason seems to be 
an ex post facto attempt to justify a decision 
that had not gone according to the original 
plan. According to the evidence, by 1950 
Stalin had developed a strategy in Korea, 
which included a backup plan, or at least an excuse.
As the correspondence between the Soviet Union and the 
DPRK from 1949 to 1950 indicates, Stalin believed that the 
US was unlikely to intervene militarily in June 1950, and he 
preferred a quick North Korean victory with no US interven-
tion. Stalin did recognize, however, that there was still a risk of 
US intervention, and he saw the guarantee of Chinese involve-
ment as a counterbalance in such an occurrence.
There were, as William Stueck notes, other possible reasons 
why the Soviet Union did not return to the Security Coun-
cil after the attack. For example, “Stalin may have feared such 
action would increase the danger of a di-
rect military confrontation with the Unit-
ed States; or… [he] may have wanted to 
demonstrate that the international organi-
zation was toothless even without a Soviet 
presence.”  Andrei Gromyko advised Stalin 
not to boycott the session and claimed in 
his memoirs, “Stalin was for once guided by 
emotion.” At the same time, Stalin probably 
believed that US involvement in a Korean 
conflict was acceptable for the Soviet Union. 
Understanding that if the US defended the 
South, he would not pay a high price, Si-
no-US relations would deteriorate, and China’s dependence 
on the USSR would be reinforced,  an America overextend-
ed in East Asia and less able to react quickly to future events 
in Europe was for Stalin an acceptable outcome of the attack, 
even if Korea was not quickly unified under the North.
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